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The Honorable William L. Dwyer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

AT&T CORP.,

MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION,

ASSOCIATION FOR LOCAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES.

McLEOD USA TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, INC.,

ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

GST TELECOM, INC..

Plaintiffs,

v.

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. C98-634 WD

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TO AT&T'S REPLY

Appendix 1: Declaration of John A. McMaster

Appendix 2: Declaration of Clifford S. Holtz

APPENDIX - 1

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1 Appendix 3: Declaration of Charles Ward

2 Appendix 4: Declaration of Lewis M. Chakrin

3 Appendix 5: Excerpts from Reply Comments of U S WEST, Inc., In re Implementation
4 of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the
5 Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Dkt No. 96-149,
6 (August 30, 1996)

7 Appendix 6: Selected Documents Produced by Qwest Communications, Inc. [FILED
8 UNDER SEAL]

9 Appendix 7: Teaming Agreement Between U S WEST Communications, Inc. and
10 Qwest Communications, Inc., dated April 21, 1998 [FILED UNDER
11 SEAL]

12 Appendix 8: Excerpted Pages From the Deposition of Stephen Michael Jacobsen dated
13 May 28, 1998 [FILED UNDER SEAL]

14 Appendix 9: Excerpted Pages From the Deposition of Kathy Stephens dated May 27,
15 1998 [FILED UNDER SEAL]

16 Appendix 10: Selected Documents Produced by Qwest Communications, Inc. [FILED
17 UNDER SEAL]

18 Appendix 11: Statement of FCC Chairman William Kennard on U S WEST/
19 Ameritech/Quest Agreement dated May 21, 1998

20 Appendix 12: Excerpts From Deposition of Michael Murphy dated May 28, 1998
21 [FILED UNDER SEAL]

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APPENDIX - 2

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Seattle

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The Honorable William L. Dwyer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

AT&T CORP.,
MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES,
McLEOD USA TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, INC.,
ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
GST TELECOM, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. C98-634 WD

DECLARATION OF JOHN A.
MCMASTER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, John A. McMaster, declare as follows:

1. I submit this Reply Declaration in further support of AT&T Corp.'s ("AT&T's")
motion for an order requiring U S WEST Communications, Inc. ("U S WEST") immediately to

1 cease the joint marketing of its local services and the long distance services of Qwest
2 Communications International Inc. ("Qwest") or any other long distance carriers in the 14 States
3 where U S WEST has local monopolies. My background is set forth in my prior declaration.

4 2. In this Reply Declaration, I will respond to claims that U S WEST has made in its
5 Memorandum in Opposition to AT&T's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in the affidavits
6 accompanying that Memorandum in Opposition, and address some of the discovery we have
7 obtained since the preparation of my previous Declaration. In Part I, I will respond to
8 U S WEST's assertion that its Buyer's Advantage Program with Qwest complies with the
9 applicable equal access requirements because U S WEST has ostensibly offered to make the
10 same agreement available to other carriers on the same terms as with Qwest. Specifically, I will
11 show that the U S WEST/Qwest agreement has been structured in such a way as to make it
12 impossible, as a practical matter, for AT&T to enter into it -- at least without incurring
13 enormous economic and competitive penalties that Qwest does not incur. The power of U S
14 WEST's monopoly, and the enormous competitive advantage any long distance carrier that
15 partnered with it could secure, would give U S WEST the ability to dictate pricing, service
16 standards, and all other critical issues that shape the long distance offering through take-it-or-
17 leave-it marketing agreements with particular carriers, and in this instance it has shaped a take-it-
18 or-leave-it agreement that AT&T could not conceivably sign. The result is a situation in which
19 one long-distance carrier is substantially favored with the opportunity to obtain the enormous
20 advantages of this marketing alliance while others are substantially disadvantaged by being
21 effectively denied that same opportunity.

22 3. In Part II of this Declaration, I will explain that the discovery we have recently
23 obtained shows that U S WEST is discriminating to benefit Qwest in its use of the carrier and
24 customer information it has by virtue of its local monopoly to benefit Qwest, and abusing its
25 position as the administrator of the system by which customers' pre-designated choices of long
26 distance carriers are implemented. Specifically, U S WEST is using that information to market

1 Qwest's service while denying that same information to other long distance carriers. This further
2 illustrates the importance of adherence to equal access requirements and to the restrictions on
3 BOC provision of interLATA services prior to the BOC's demonstration to the FCC that it has
4 opened its local markets to competition, for it confirms some of the ways in which U S WEST
5 can, and apparently will, abuse its monopoly position if it has the incentive to benefit one long
6 distance carrier at the expense of others.

7 4. Finally, in Part III of this Declaration, I will respond to several miscellaneous
8 claims made by U S WEST's witnesses.

9 **I. U S WEST's "Offer" To Enter Into A Marketing Alliance With AT&T On The**
10 **Same Terms As Qwest Is Specious Because It Would Require AT&T To Agree To**
11 **Foreclose Competition In Important Segments Of The Market And To Incur**
12 **Enormous Financial and Competitive Penalties That Qwest Does Not Incur.**

13 5. Because of U S WEST's monopoly, its alliance with a particular long distance
14 carrier over others has enormous marketplace repercussions. Many customers find the idea of a
15 package of local and long distance service, and the ability to engage in "one-stop shopping,"
16 highly attractive. and the bottleneck control U S WEST exercises over the local markets in its
17 region means no long distance carrier can offer such a package (absent the unprecedented
18 method challenged in this case). Indeed, I have always understood that one of the principal
19 reasons the BOCs are prohibited from providing long-distance service while their local
20 monopolies remain intact is to prevent them from foreclosing the market for bundled services in
21 precisely this way -- by creating a packaged offer that no competitor could match.

22 6. Further, U S WEST's local monopoly means that its endorsement of a particular
23 long distance carrier, and its grant of preferential access to its marketing channels, confers an
24 exceptionally powerful advantage. For example, any customer in U S WEST's service areas that
25 orders local service, additional local lines, new calling features, or even wants a new phone
26 number or has a question about his or her local service, must call U S WEST's "customer care"
channel -- its general telephone number for service orders and inquiries. That same channel also
serves as the principal means by which customers order long distance service. Indeed, the power

1 of that asset is such that, notwithstanding the hundreds of millions of dollars AT&T spends
2 annually on proactive marketing efforts like telemarketing, direct mail, television and print
3 advertising, and other sales through 800 numbers, a majority of AT&T customers nationwide
4 sign up for AT&T through their local telephone company's customer care channel because it is
5 the only place consumers can acquire their telephone numbers.

6 7. For the last fourteen years -- until the last two weeks -- AT&T and other long
7 distance carriers have been able to rely on that channel to serve as a neutral conduit for
8 customers to order their long distance service. In U S WEST's region, however, that channel's
9 neutrality has now been corrupted and it will now serve as a marketing service for U S WEST's
10 chosen long-distance carrier. While U S WEST states that it will continue to process the
11 selections of customers that choose another carrier over its recommendation, and to read those
12 customers a list of available carriers other than Qwest if the customers so request, it will now use
13 its customer care channel, as well as other marketing vehicles, to expressly urge its customers to
14 choose Qwest. The marketing materials U S WEST has provided through discovery show that U
15 S WEST is now affirmatively using its customer care channel and other marketing channels in
16 this way. See Exhibit A (appended hereto). Indeed, in one-third of the 93 test calls we made to
17 U S WEST's customer care channel this week, when the U S WEST sales representative was
18 asked generally "Who do you recommend (suggest) for long distance?", the sales representative
19 specifically encouraged the customer to order service from Qwest.

20 8. U S WEST has defended the arrangement with Qwest as consistent with equal
21 access requirements in part by asserting that it would make the same arrangement "equally"
22 available to other long distance carriers on the same terms as it agreed to with Qwest. I
23 explained in my previous affidavit (¶¶ 23-25) some of the ways in which this arrangement is
24 inherently unequal, including the "first mover" advantage that U S WEST has conferred upon
25 Qwest by entering into and implementing its agreement with Qwest alone in the first instance,
26 and only then inviting other carriers to participate. The power of the alliance with U S WEST,

1 and the extent of Qwest's advantage in being the only long distance carrier so favored, has since
2 been vividly confirmed. In the first three days alone of this alliance, U S WEST announced that
3 40,000 customers had switched to Qwest under the Buyer's Advantage Program -- even though
4 Qwest had not remotely achieved such success previously, when acting alone. More recently, U
5 S WEST announced that 100,000 customers have now switched to Qwest -- when the alliance is
6 only two weeks old. See Customer Demand Reaches 100,000 Mark for Buyer's Advantage
7 Program (U S WEST Press Release) (May 27, 1998).

8 9. Moreover, since the filing of my previous affidavit, we have obtained and
9 reviewed the US WEST/Qwest contract. That review has made it abundantly clear that U S
10 WEST's claim that the contract is equally available to all long distance carriers is specious. It is
11 as if a tailor, after custom-designing a suit for a particular individual, then claimed that everyone
12 else was being treated equally simply because they all could purchase that very same suit. The U
13 S WEST/Qwest agreement contains numerous provisions that are not problematic for Qwest, but
14 that are "poison pills" for AT&T and that render the agreement absolutely unusable by AT&T.

15 10. Perhaps the most blatantly anticompetitive "poison pill" are the agreement's
16 provisions on the increasingly competitive market segment for "intralata toll" calls. LATAs are
17 the local areas within which the BOCs are permitted to provide service. "Intralata toll" calls are
18 those calls within a LATA for which a toll charge is assessed (for example, calls from Seattle to
19 Tacoma). Until recently, although other carriers have had the facilities necessary to provide
20 intralata toll service, this market segment, like purely local calling, has been part of the BOC
21 monopolies. That is because only the BOCs could offer customers 1+ dialing -- the ability to
22 make calls by dialing 1 and then the telephone number -- while customers of other carriers would
23 have had to dial several extra digits. That was an often dispositive disincentive for any customer
24 to use any carrier other than U S WEST for intralata toll service. However, over the course of
25 the last 2 years, approximately 20 States, including several in U S WEST's region, have ordered
26

1 the BOCs to modify their facilities to enable their competitors, like AT&T, to provide 1+ dialing
2 for intralata toll service as well.

3 11. In those States in which a level playing field has thus been established, AT&T
4 and other long distance carriers have been having great success in eroding the BOC's monopolies
5 in this market segment, and consumers have benefited greatly from the expanded choices this
6 competition has generated. Indeed, AT&T now has 10 million customers signed up for intralata
7 toll service, and this \$7 billion market segment now generates revenue for AT&T of
8 approximately \$750 million a year.

9 12. Under Section 1.2 of the U S WEST/Qwest agreement, however, the package that
10 is marketed by U S WEST must include U S WEST's intraLATA toll service, and U S WEST
11 has stated that this item is non-negotiable. See Stephens Deposition, pp. 121, 124 (Exhibit B)
12 (appended hereto). Further, Section 1.3 of that agreement then prohibits Qwest from engaging in
13 any targeted marketing efforts for intralata toll service directed at customers of the package.
14 Accordingly, for AT&T to enter into such a marketing alliance with U S WEST, it would have to
15 agree to cede the intralata toll market to U S WEST. (Recall that most customers, as a result of
16 its monopoly over local service, come to AT&T and other long distance carriers through U S
17 WEST). Still worse, because AT&T would be required to pay a fee to U S WEST, purportedly
18 to reimburse a portion of its "marketing costs" for the Buyer's Advantage Program, AT&T would
19 be subsidizing U S WEST's intralata toll service in direct competition with AT&T's own intralata
20 toll service.

21 13. This is apparently of no concern to Qwest, because its network, unlike AT&T's,
22 is not configured to compete for intralata toll customers. As Qwest's President explained in
23 response to press inquiries on the subject, "I'm not interested in intraLATA toll market right now.
24 It doesn't match the assets I have. It is not a good business for me so I've chosen not to offer
25 that." Press Conference Transcript, p. 5 (Exhibit C) (appended hereto). AT&T, by contrast,
26 which has invested enormously in this service and has included it in every one of its marketing

1 and sale channels, would now have to finance the marketing of its dominant competitor's (U S
2 WEST's) service. AT&T could not agree to any such financial and competitive penalty, or such
3 an anticompetitive and anticonsumer result.

4 14. The "Buyer's Advantage" package would also require that AT&T cede other
5 market segments to U S WEST -- segments in which Qwest does not participate or to which it is
6 otherwise indifferent, but in which AT&T has invested substantially and competes vigorously
7 with U S WEST. For example, calling cards are a multi-billion dollar business for AT&T.
8 AT&T's cards compete, however, with the calling cards issued by U S WEST, and Sections 1.2
9 and 1.3 of the Qwest agreement likewise reserve the calling card portion of the package to U S
10 WEST. U S WEST's marketing materials show that customers of the Buyer's Advantage
11 Program are sent U S WEST calling cards. See Exhibit D (appended hereto). Thus, if AT&T
12 were to seek the benefit of being promoted through U S WEST's unique marketing channels, the
13 price would again be that it agree to finance a marketing effort that would compete directly with
14 AT&T's own products.

15 15. These competition-foreclosing aspects of the Qwest/US WEST agreement alone
16 preclude AT&T's participation. At the same time, even if those aspects were not present in the
17 agreement -- i.e., even if the package U S WEST marketed did not include products which long
18 distance carriers like AT&T market in competition with U S WEST -- AT&T (and many
19 similarly situated long distance carriers) still would be unable to sign that agreement without
20 suffering serious competitive harms that Qwest will not suffer.

21 16. First, the Qwest agreement would require that AT&T conform to Qwest's pricing
22 structure. AT&T believes that it offers higher value service than Qwest -- greater network
23 reliability and capabilities, more responsive customer service, and so on -- and in some instances
24 charges the higher price that it believes such service is worth. The flexibility to offer a range of
25 high quality services is how we differentiate ourselves in the market, and AT&T charges prices
26 that reflect the value of our services. U S WEST has made clear, however, that it has made a

1 commitment to Qwest not to permit any carrier to enter into a marketing alliance with it if that
2 carrier charges a higher price than Qwest, and that it will adhere to that commitment regardless
3 of whether the service is of higher quality. Deposition of Kathy Stephens, p. 120 (Exhibit E)
4 (appended hereto). By setting maximum prices for participation in these agreements, U S WEST
5 has ensured that higher quality providers will, as a practical matter, be unable to participate
6 unless they surrender the flexibility to design their service.

7 17. Second, the Qwest/U S WEST agreement is silent on the extent of marketing
8 efforts that U S WEST will undertake on Qwest's behalf, leaving that to U S WEST's "sole
9 discretion" (Section 2.7). This means that, if U S WEST were to enter into such agreements with
10 multiple carriers, it would still be able to confer enormous discriminatory benefits on some of
11 those carriers over others merely by deciding to market their services more aggressively than the
12 services of others with whom it had reached such an agreement.

13 18. Moreover, even if U S WEST in that circumstance marketed AT&T's service
14 more vigorously than other carriers' services -- as it might well do, given that AT&T's brand and
15 reputation might make such marketing efforts more successful and U S WEST would thereby
16 earn more per-customer fees -- that might well harm rather than help AT&T. Unlike Qwest,
17 which obtains few customers through the normal carrier selection process, many of the
18 customers that might sign up for a package offered by U S WEST and AT&T under such an
19 agreement would have signed up for AT&T without any such package. Under the agreement,
20 however, AT&T would be required to pay a fee to Qwest for the same customers it would have
21 acquired in the absence of the agreement -- indeed, in some instances, to pay a fee to Qwest for
22 transferring pre-existing AT&T customers from an AT&T plan to Buyer's Advantage. Further,
23 AT&T would suddenly be barred by Section 3.4 of the agreement, which limits the uses to which
24 the parties may put information about the package's subscribers, from targeting other marketing
25 campaigns for other services at those same customers. This would constitute an additional
26 competitive penalty with respect to the many customers whom AT&T would have likewise won

1 even in the absence of the agreement and who thus would not otherwise have been subject to
2 additional marketing restrictions.

3 19. Third, AT&T markets and sells many of its services in a single "point of sale
4 bundle." In other words, AT&T's sales representatives attempt to "cross-sell" a range of
5 products -- long distance service, intralata toll, calling cards, personal 800 service, wireless,
6 Internet, and others -- in a single contact with the potential customer. If, for example, a customer
7 calls to order a long distance service discount plan, our representatives do not end the call when
8 that sale is completed, but instead inquire about -- and are prepared to address -- any interest the
9 customer may have in other AT&T products. AT&T expended \$85 million in 1997 to teach its
10 "customer care" personnel -- who previously were merely responding to customer inquiries --
11 how to act proactively as salespersons and market and sell the broad range of AT&T products in
12 this way.

13 However, if, in order to avoid being competitively disadvantaged by Qwest's preferential
14 access to U S WEST's marketing and local service, AT&T were compelled to enter into an
15 arrangement with U S WEST that paralleled the Qwest arrangement, U S WEST would then be
16 duplicating many of the marketing functions that currently are handled internally at AT&T.
17 AT&T would then have to either downsize its marketing force and lay off personnel in whom it
18 had invested substantially over the years, or incur substantially excessive and duplicative
19 marketing costs. At the same time, because U S WEST would be assuming some but not all of
20 AT&T's marketing functions, AT&T would no longer be able to take advantage of the
21 efficiencies that come with marketing a range of services in a single point of sale, and would not,
22 as a matter of economics, be able to market services like intralata toll and calling cards to the
23 same degree as it does today.

24 20. More fundamentally, dismantling its marketing infrastructure is not a realistic
25 option for AT&T. AT&T has devoted massive resources to positioning itself to enter the local
26 market in U S WEST's territory, and in the territories of the other BOCs, and ultimately to

1 provide "one-stop shopping." That has not been possible yet because the Telecommunications
2 Act prohibits such joint marketing by AT&T for a period of time that has not yet expired, and
3 because, in any event, U S WEST has failed to comply with its statutory obligation to open its
4 local market to competition and make broadbased local exchange competition possible. If and
5 when those constraints are eliminated -- at which point, as long as it satisfies the other statutory
6 prerequisites, U S WEST will itself be permitted by the FCC to enter the long distance market
7 under Section 271 of the Act -- AT&T intends to use its technical and marketing expertise to
8 compete aggressively against U S WEST, which likewise will be offering one-stop shopping.
9 Yet in order to avail itself of the extraordinary short-term advantages conferred by the Qwest
10 agreement and to avoid the competitive disadvantage of being excluded from that relationship,
11 AT&T would have to help build up U S WEST as the perceived provider of one-stop shopping
12 today among customers within U S WEST's region, while at the same time diminishing its own
13 marketing operations in ways that could not quickly or easily be reversed once the marketing
14 alliance terminated and AT&T and U S WEST began competing head to head.

15 21. For all these reasons, it appears quite clear that U S WEST has designed an
16 agreement that favors small carriers with a narrow scope of services that do not include intralata
17 toll -- the carriers that pose the least significant competitive threat to U S WEST, today or in the
18 near future -- over larger carriers that represent a more significant long-term competitive
19 challenge. The reality is that every long distance carrier's operations are different. Any time an
20 agreement like this one is designed, some carriers will be far better able to conform to its terms
21 than others, and those carriers will be in a favored position when it comes to taking advantage of
22 this kind of opportunity. For example, if U S WEST were willing to customize an arrangement
23 for AT&T, its current competitor in the intralata toll market, the same problem I am addressing
24 here would arise in reverse, because it would likely be as difficult for Qwest to accept an
25 agreement tailored to AT&T as for AT&T to accept one tailored to Qwest.
26

1 **II. U S WEST's Discriminatory Use of Customer and Carrier Information And Abuse**
2 **of its Role as PIC Administrator**

3 22. One of the reasons the restriction on providing interlata services and the equal
4 access requirements are so essential is that U S WEST and the other monopoly local exchange
5 carriers play critical roles as the "PIC administrators" within their regions. PIC stands for
6 "primary interexchange carrier," and it refers to the customer's pre-designated choice of long
7 distance carrier. In order to effectuate that choice, U S WEST must send software instructions to
8 its switch so that each customer's long distance calls will be routed to the network of his or her
9 chosen long distance company.

10 23. U S WEST thus maintains a database that lists all its local customers and the PIC
11 that each has chosen. In some instances -- such as when the customer chooses a long distance
12 carrier at the same time he or she orders local phone service from U S WEST -- U S WEST will
13 obtain that information from the customer directly. In other instances -- such as when a
14 customer calls AT&T and informs AT&T that he or she wishes to subscribe to AT&T's long
15 distance service -- the long distance carrier (in this example, AT&T) will inform U S WEST of
16 the customer's new PIC. U S WEST receives that information only because, as the local
17 monopoly, it must program its switches to route calls correctly; it does not gain that information
18 through marketing efforts of its own.

19 24. This database would have enormous value to long distance carriers marketing
20 their services, because the identity of a customer's existing carrier can be extremely useful in
21 tailoring a sales pitch seeking to persuade the customer to switch carriers. U S WEST refuses to
22 permit AT&T -- and presumably other long distance carriers -- access to this database.
23 Moreover, ever since the beginning of 1997, U S WEST has even refused to give AT&T an
24 updated list of names and telephone numbers of potential customers in the region that does not
25 identify their long distance carriers. At the same time, however, its sales representatives who
26 market Qwest's service are being given access to the PIC database. In several of the marketing
27 scripts that U S WEST is using and that we have been given in discovery, the sales representative

1 is directed to make specific reference to the customer's PIC, stating that "I see you have long
2 distance company XYZ on your existing line(s)" before trying to sell the customer Buyer's
3 Advantage. See Exhibit F (appended hereto). The U S WEST marketing scripts further appear
4 to indicate that U S WEST is marketing Qwest's service to customers at "non-published"
5 numbers. See Exhibit G (appended hereto). Again, using access to those numbers -- which no
6 long-distance carrier can obtain, and which U S WEST possesses solely by virtue of its
7 monopoly position -- to benefit a single long distance carrier is severely discriminatory and
8 abusive.

9 **III. Responses to Other U S WEST claims.**

10 25. Ms. Stephens' affidavit for U S WEST indicates (§ 21) that AT&T has recently
11 noted the possibility of entering into a marketing alliance with one or more BOCs, and Ms.
12 Stephens implies that this indicates that the Qwest agreement is equally available to carriers
13 other than Qwest and that AT&T is not being harmed by it. Any such implication would be
14 false. If, contrary to AT&T's view, this agreement is not deemed unlawful, AT&T will then
15 have to take all available steps to mitigate the harm the agreement and the similar one between
16 Qwest and Ameritech are causing. Such steps could include seeking similar arrangements with
17 BOCs in other regions -- but under terms that, in contrast to the U S WEST/Qwest and
18 Ameritech/Qwest agreements, would be suitably tailored to AT&T's business. That business
19 reality in no way changes the harm AT&T is suffering within U S WEST's region right now, or
20 alters the fact that, as a practical and economic matter, AT&T is unable to enter into the same
21 agreement as Qwest.

22 26. Ms. Aguilar maintains (§§ 17-20) that U S WEST cannot discriminate against
23 individual long distance carriers in the provision of access services because its network is
24 automated and the software that routes calls and schedules maintenance does not enable
25 individual carriers to be favored over others. The FCC has expressly rejected the claim that the
26

1 automated nature of these systems obviates concerns about discrimination.¹ In all events, Ms.
2 Aguilar has limited her discussion to "plain vanilla" long distance calls. Even if her point were
3 valid in that context, she has simply ignored all the circumstances in which the provision of
4 access services is not at all automated but is, to the contrary, based on highly subjective and
5 discretionary decisions by the BOC. In particular, when AT&T develops a new service or an
6 enhancement on an existing service, it must often go to U S WEST in order to have U S WEST
7 design a new access arrangement to support the new service. There is an enormous range of
8 competence, speed, and reliability with which U S WEST can choose to complete that task, and
9 even Ms. Aguilar does not and cannot provide any reason for believing that U S WEST is
10 incapable of acting in a discriminatory fashion in such circumstances. One of the principal
11 reasons the 1996 Act, and before that the consent decree, prohibit a BOC from entering the long
12 distance market while they retain their local monopolies is to remove the incentive to abuse those
13 monopolies in precisely that way.

14 27. Mr. Jacobsen of Qwest states that he does not believe that U S WEST is
15 "providing" the long distance services because it is using Qwest's facilities and will mention
16 Qwest's name. I leave it to the attorneys to address the legal definition of "provide." From a
17 customer perspective, U S WEST is plainly "providing" this service. It is contacting the
18 customer to make the offer; it is including the service as part of a U S WEST package; it is
19 billing the customer; and it is handling much of the subsequent "customer care" contacts by
20 calling the customer periodically to determine whether the customer is satisfied with the service.
21 From a customer's viewpoint, all of that is part of the "service" he or she receives and it is likely
22 that many if not most customers will think of it as a US WEST service. Indeed, from the
23 customer's perspective, U S WEST will look exactly like a resale carrier -- a carrier that lacks
24 facilities of its own, but purchases service from a carrier like AT&T and then resells that service
25 to customers. Often such resellers will explain to customers that they use AT&T's facilities --


26 ¹ See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905 (1996), ¶ 243.

1 just as U S WEST states that it is using Qwest's facilities -- in order to assure the customer of the
2 quality of the service, and even U S WEST agrees that resale carriers are nonetheless "providing"
3 the long distance service. See U S WEST Brief, p. 20 (a carrier can "provide" service "by
4 purchasing access to another carrier's network"). Indeed, the inevitable consequence of this
5 arrangement is that numerous customers will become confused and believe that they are
6 purchasing long distance service from U S WEST today. For example, when Ameritech
7 announced a parallel deal with Qwest, the Chicago Tribune headline stated: "Ameritech To Offer
8 Long Distance." Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1998 (Exhibit H) (appended hereto).

9 Finally, Mr. Jacobsen also states (§ 7) that Qwest "does not have the name brand
10 recognition and financial resources to compete at [the] level" of AT&T and MCI, and that it
11 therefore needed to partner with the local monopoly in order to market its service. But no
12 company starts out with broad name brand recognition or financial resources. If Qwest offers a
13 good product that customers might wish to purchase, it can do what every other company does --
14 raise the necessary capital and market its product, and become known among consumers through
15 these traditional, pro-competitive means. Notably, while AT&T has a very strong brand today,
16 that was not always the case. When the Bell System was broken up, AT&T fought hard -- and
17 unsuccessfully -- to acquire the right to use the Bell name, because the name AT&T, while well
18 known in the financial community for its stock, had very little recognition among consumers.
19 But AT&T made a substantial investment in marketing and advertising, and over time developed
20 a brand name that is associated with quality. MCI, Sprint, and Worldcom likewise did not start
21 out with strong brands, but developed them. Contrary to Mr. Jacobsen's suggestion, there is no
22 reason Qwest cannot follow the same path.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
on May 29, 1998.


John A. McMaster



Scripting for offering with Qwest:

"Now that we have taken care of _____, as your **single point of contact**, I can now help with not only local service, but also in-state and state-to-state long distance service from Qwest Communications as well."

"U S WEST Communications has teamed up with Qwest Communications to offer you and your company a single point of contact for all your communication services."

"You have a choice of many long distance carriers, but if you select Qwest Communications..."

- your state-to-state (or interstate) rates will be \$.10 per minute, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and
- your in-state (or interLATA) rates will be \$.12 per minute, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week."

"There are . . .

- no monthly fees
- you will have only one bill - your U S WEST Communications phone bill
- there is no monthly minimum charge and
- currently the carrier change charge of \$5.00 per line is being waived."

"Would you like me to sign you up for the Qwest long distance service?"

If Yes: "Would you like to take advantage of this savings on any other accounts? Your effective date will be _____." (See Ordering section for due dates by state)

If No: "Are there any questions that I have not addressed for you?"

"Is there anything else I can help you with today?"

If Yes: Proceed to address any new customer issues. Any changes with a different due date, should be on a separate order from the Qwest service offering.

If No: "Thank you for your business."

Go to Selling

The Honorable William L. Dwyer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

AT&T CORP.,

MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION,

ASSOCIATION FOR LOCAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES,

McLEOD USA TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, INC.,

ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

GST TELECOM, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. C98-634 WD

EXHIBIT B TO DECLARATION OF
JOHN A. MCMASTER

FILED UNDER SEAL

EXHIBIT B

**TRANSCRIPT OF QWEST PRESS CONFERENCE
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1998**

OPERATOR: Welcome to our conference call. At this time all participants are in a listen-only mode. Later we will conduct a question and answer session. At that time if you have a question you will need to press the 1 followed by the 4 on your push button phone. As a reminder, this conference is being recorded today, Thursday, May 14, 1998. I would now like to turn the conference over to Mr. Lee Wolfe, Vice President of Industrial Relations for Qwest Communications. Please go ahead, sir.

LEE: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Qwest conference call. As you are all aware, we announced a significant teaming arrangement with Ameritech this morning and with me to discuss this announcement and other recent related developments is Joe Nacchio, the President and CEO of Qwest; but, before we hear from Joe, I would like to caution you that this analyst call may contain forward-looking statements and management cautions that these forward-looking statements are based on current information and analysis and are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied. These risks and uncertainties are discussed in the company's filings with the SEC. Joe.

NACCHIO: Hey, thanks, Lee, and thank you all for joining us this morning. I know many of you saw the releases this morning or read the papers, so, you know essentially what the details of the arrangement are; but, let me just, I would like to briefly summarize that because I think there is a lot of misunderstanding, based on questions we continue to get, and then I would like to also jump into what I'm sure you're all interested in and that's why do we believe we can do this and how do we believe this is in the best interest of public policy. So, let me just jump in, first. The arrangement with Ameritech is similar to the one we announced a week ago with U S WEST, where we have essentially set up a teaming relationship for them to market our long distance services in their territory. It is not an exclusive arrangement either way. We do not have an exclusive that we will be the only long distance company because as you know they are precluded from doing that. They will make the arrangement available to all other comers if they want to come. Maybe we can talk about why the big carriers are not coming later. Secondly, I don't want to be exclusive either because I want to be able to protect myself in the future in terms of my own brand. I, as a matter of note, should point out because I know I'll get the question later, we have fundamental disagreements with our teaming partners here on 271. We don't believe they should be